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CRIMINAL LAW-No RIGHT TO REVOKE AND AVOID SEARCH-
NINTH CIRCUIT RULES THAT CONSENT TO AIRPORT SCREENING
CANNOT BE REVOKED IN AN ADMINISTRATIVE SEARCH. United
States v. Aukai, 497 F.3d 955 (9th Cir. 2007).
I. INTRODUCTION
"[T]he safety and security of the civil air transportation system is criti-
cal to the security of the United States and its national defense."' Millions of
people fly every day and every one of them is subject to the rigorous and
time-consuming process of airport screening searches. Most people, howev-
er, are willing to comply because they understand that the search is in place
to deter terrorist hijackings and bombings, especially in the aftermath of
9/112 These searches pose a challenging situation for courts that must de-
cide if the searches meet the Fourth Amendment3 requirement of freedom
from unreasonable searches and seizures. The challenge arises because the
searches require the suspicionless, warrantless search of millions of people.
In the past, Courts accepted several exceptions to the Fourth Amendment,
but the Ninth Circuit correctly relied on administrative searches and
correctly interpreted airport administrative searches to not allow pas-
sengers to revoke their consent to airport searches.
This note examines the Ninth Circuit's decision in United States v.
Auka4 that held that airport screenings are justifiable under the ad-
ministrative search exception to the Fourth Amendment, and that
consent is not required to conduct these searches The note will ex-
plore airport security searches by first briefly discussing the Fourth
Amendment and giving an overview of its requirements and excep-
tions to the rule.' This Amendment is the foundation courts use when
they begin to analyze airport searches. The note then describes the
history of airport searches This history demonstrates the evolution of
airport security and shows how Congress has consistently responded
to threats to air safety by passing new legislation.
1. H.R. REP. No. 107-296, at 53 (2001)(Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 2002
U.S.C.C.A.N 589, 590.
2. On September 11, 2001, four separate and coordinated aircraft hijackings in
the United States were used as guided missiles to kill thousands of people. Deborah
von Rochow-Leuschner, CAPPS II and the Fourth Amendment: Does it Fly?, 69 J.
AIR L. & COM. 139, 139 (2004).
3. U.S. CONST. amend. IV
4. 497 F.3d 955 (9th Cir. 2007).
5. See infra Part III.
6. See infra Part II.A.
7. See infra Part II.B.2.
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After reviewing the history of airport regulations, the note dis-
cusses the consent exception to the warrant or probable cause re-
quirement of the Fourth Amendment, covering both express and im-
plied consent.8 The last topic covered in the background is that of ad-
ministrative searches.9 The note then covers the United States v. Aukai
opinion-both the facts and reasoning of the decision."0 The note con-
cludes by analyzing the importance of the decision."
II. BACKGROUND
This section first discusses the Fourth Amendment and explains
the purpose, requirements, and various exceptions to the warrant re-
quirement of the amendment. This section then details airport secu-
rity, discussing the history and rationale for security measures, and
looks at the effect of terrorism on such measures. 3 It next discusses
express and implied consent, and the purpose, scope, and require-
ments of this exception to the warrant requirement.' Finally, this sec-
tion covers administrative searches, describing the purpose, scope, and
requirements of the exception.
A. The Fourth Amendment
The Fourth Amendment gives people the right to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures. 6 The Amendment states the fol-
lowing:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, hous-
es, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue,
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirma-
tion, and particularly describing the place to be searched,
and the persons or things to be seized."
8. See infra Part II.C.
9. See infra Part II.D.
10. See infra Part III.
11. See infra Part IV.
12. See infra Part II.A.
13. See infra Part II.B.
14. See infra Part II.C.
15. See infra Part II.D.
16. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
17. Id.
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1. Test for a Search Within the Meaning of the Fourth Amend-
ment
The United States Supreme Court articulated that protection un-
der the Fourth Amendment applies when a person "can claim a 'justi-
fiable,' a 'reasonable,' or a 'legitimate expectation of privacy' that has
been invaded by government action.' 8 The analysis, as Justice Harlan
stated in his concurring opinion in Katz v. United States,'9 consists of
two inquiries.' The first is whether the person had an expectation of
privacy, and the second is whether the person's expectation of privacy
is one society has accepted as reasonable2'-whether the expectation is
justifiable under the circumstances.2 This analysis from Katz is com-
monly adopted as the definition for a "search." 23 Thus, Katz creates a
threshold test for the Fourth Amendment: if there is no reasonable
expectation of privacy, the Fourth Amendment is not a consideration,
which would make the search or seizure presumably permissible. 24 If
there is a reasonable expectation of privacy, however, the Govern-
ment must show that the intrusion was justifiable under the Fourth
Amendment."
2. Requirements and Exceptions Under the Fourth Amendment
Once the Fourth Amendment is implicated, the question becomes
whether the search or seizure is reasonable.26 If the search or seizure is
not reasonable, then it is prohibited. A search is generally unreason-
18. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 280 (1983) (quoting Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967)).
19. 389 U.S. at 361.
20. Knotts, 460 U.S. at 280-81.
21. Id. at 281 (citing Katz, 389 U.S. at 361). The court distinguishes the two inqui-
ries by stating that the first inquiry is based on whether the individual's conduct exhi-
bits a subjective expectation of privacy. Id. In contrast, the second inquiry is based on
whether the person's subjective expectation is objectively justifiable under the cir-
cumstances. Id.
22. Id. (citing Katz, 389 U.S. at 353).
23. Michael J. DeGrave, Note, Airline Passenger Profiling and the Fourth
Amendment: Will Capps II be Cleared for Takeoff?, 10 B.U. J. ScI. & TECH. L. 125,
133 (2004).
24. Id.
25. United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 905 (9th Cir. 1973) (overruled by U.S. v.
Aukai, 497 F.3d 955 (9th Cir. 2007)).
26. Robert C. Power, Changing Expectations of Privacy and the Fourth Amend-
ment, 16 WIDENER L.J. 43, 54 (2006).
27. See Davis, 482 F.2d at 910.
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able if there is no warrant that is based upon probable cause or indivi-
dualized suspicion of wrongdoing.' Reasonableness is determined by
balancing the necessity of the search with the invasion the search will
cause.
29
The majority of searches and seizures must be based on probable
cause, unless consent is given.3" In addition, courts have generally held
that searches conducted without a warrant supported by probable
cause are per se unreasonable.3 As the National Treasury Employees
Union v. Von Raab 2 Court stated, however, "neither a warrant nor
probable cause, nor, indeed, any measure of individualized suspicion,
is an indispensable component of reasonableness in every circums-
tance."33 In particular, there are four generally recognized exceptions
to the warrant requirement.' The exceptions implicated in the re-
mainder of this section are consent and administrative searches.35 This
note now turns to the topic of airport security.
28. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 37 (2000).
29. Barry Kellman, Biological Terrorism: Legal Measures for Preventing Catas-
trophe, 24 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 417,478-79 (2001).
30. Sanford L. Dow, Airport Security, Terrorism, and the Fourth Amendment: A
Look Back and a Step Forward, 58 J. AIR L. & CoM. 1149, 1167 (1993).
31. Id. There is probable cause if a police officer knows facts and circumstances
that would in themselves be sufficient for "a man of reasonable caution to believe an
offense has been committed or is being committed." Id. at 1167 (citing Draper v.
United States, 358 U.S. 307, 313 (1959) (quoting Carroll v. United Sates, 267 U.S. 132,
162 (1925))).
The purpose of the warrant is to ensure that a judicial officer can give a deliberate and
impartial judgment to interject between the police officer and the citizen, and that the
judicial officer can weigh the evidence that the police officer found to raise probable
cause. Brett Andrew Skean, The Fourth Amendment and the New Face of Terrorism:
How September 11th Could Change the Way America Flies, 22 N. ILL. U. L. REv. 567,
569 (2002).
32. 489 U.S. 656 (1989).
33. Id. at 665.
34. Dow, supra note 30, at 1167-68 (listing "(1) stop-and-frisk search; (2) adminis-
trative searches; (3) the border search; and (4) searches based on express or implied
consent.").
35. Dow, supra note 30, at 1168. A third exception is the "border search," which
is premised on the idea that at borders of the country mere suspicion is the only re-
quirement to justify a search. Id. at 1183 (citing Alexander v. United States, 362 F.2d
379, 382 (9th Cir. (1966)). In addition, routine searches do not require reasonable
suspicion or probable cause. Id. (citing United States v. Montoya De Hernandez, 473
U.S. 531, 538 (1985)). Many courts have held that airports are "critical zones" because
of their special character, which makes them analogous to national borders. Id. at
1183-84 (citing United States v. Moreno, 475 F.2d 44, 51 (5th Cir. 1973)).
A fourth exception is the "stop and frisk" exception, which was established in
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). Skean, supra note 31, at 572. In Terry, the United
518 [Vol. 31
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B. Airport Security
Given the possibility of harm to numerous people and the fact
that it would be impracticable to obtain a search warrant to investigate
passengers and their luggage, courts must determine if and how air-
port searches fit within an exception to the Fourth Amendment for
the searches to be constitutional."
1. Airport Searches and the Fourth Amendment
Airport security searches fit under the Fourth Amendment analy-
sis because "[i]t is well established that screening an airline passenger
and his luggage constitutes a 'search' within the context of the Fourth
Amendment."37 Generally, when courts are analyzing airport security
cases under the Fourth Amendment, they balance "the individual pas-
senger's right to be free from exceedingly invasive searches with socie-
ty's substantial interest in safe air travel."38 The majority of courts
have held airport security searches to be within the boundaries permit-
ted by the Fourth Amendment.39 Searches would then only be uncons-
titutional under the Fourth Amendment if they were unreasonable.'
Although airport searches have been found to be permissible under
the Fourth Amendment, courts must continue to test the constitutio-
nality of the searches as they continue to evolve.
2. Security Measures in Reaction to Terrorism
Airport security measures have progressed over the years to meet
the changing threats to security. In the wake of 9/11, terrorism has
States Supreme Court determined that if police officers notice unusual conduct that
causes them to believe criminal activity may be likely to occur and that the people
may be armed and dangerous, the officers may make reasonable inquiries. Id. (citing
Terry, 392 U.S. at 30). If the officers continue to have fear for themselves or others'
safety, they can search the outer clothing of the person for weapons. Id.
36. Michael G. Lenett, Implied Consent in Airport Searches: A Response to Ter-
rorism, United States v. Pulido-Baquerizo, 800 F.2d 899 (9th Cir. 1986), 25 AM. CRIM.
L. REV. 549, 554 (discussing the time limitations to obtain warrants). Jack H. Daniel
III, Reform in Airport Security: Panic or Precaution?, 53 MERCER L. REV. 1623, 1639
(2002) (discussing the possibility of harm to numerous people).
37. Dow, supra note 30, at 1167 (citing United States v. Epperson, 454 F.2d 769,
770 (4th Cir. 1972)).
38. Skean, supra note 31, at 570.
39. Skean, supra note 31, at 570-71.
40. Skean, supra note 31, at 571.
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become the key concern for airport security."' The difficulty with pro-
tecting against terrorist attacks is the unpredictability of the acts.2
Another difficulty with deterring terrorist attacks is that, with continu-
ing advancement, the weapons used may not be detected by current
search practices. 3
a. Pre-9/11 procedures
Threats of catastrophe in mass air travel were present from the
beginning of air transportation." Congress consistently reacted to
bombings and hijackings by passing legislation and regulations meant
to prevent future attacks.' Due to the rise in terrorism since 1949, the
federal government established the Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA) in 1958 to create safety guidelines for commercial aircraft.'
The FAA had the duty to "promot[e] safe air travel and enforc[e] se-
curity measures [that affect] aircraft and air terminals. 4 1 Congress
then reacted to the rising threat of terrorism by making it illegal to
bring a concealed weapon onto an aircraft and later by mandating that
all carry-on luggage undergo screening procedures. 8 Congress contin-
41. See John Rogers, Bombs, Borders, and Boarding: Combatting International
Terrorism at United States Airports and the Fourth Amendment, 20 SUFFOLK
TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 501, 501 (1996-1997). "Terrorism" does not have a uniform defi-
nition, "but most experts agree that the concept involves a staged performance utiliz-
ing violence as a means of promoting a politically oriented cause." Id. at 501-02.
42. Id. at 502.
43. Lenett, supra note 36, at 551-52. Terrorists have been known to use items not
made of metal, such as plastic explosives, which may not set off the magnetometer.
Lenett, supra note 36, at 552. This makes the use of the magnetometer outdated be-
cause it cannot detect plastic explosives or plastic guns. Daniel, supra note 36, at 1634.
44. Daniel, supra note 36, at 1624. The first noted airplane hijacking occurred in
1931 when revolutionaries in Peru seized control of an aircraft and used it to disburse
pamphlets across the countryside. Daniel, supra note 36, at 1624-25. The first record-
ed commercial aircraft bombing was in 1949 when a woman had a time bomb placed
on a Philippine airline in order to kill her husband, which resulted in the death of her
husband and twelve other passengers. Daniel, supra note 36, at 1625. The first United
States aircraft bombing took place in 1955 when a passenger boarded a plane unaware
that there was a bomb in his luggage. Daniel, supra note 36, at 1625. The passenger's
son planted the bomb in his father's luggage to get the father's insurance policy. Da-
niel, supra note 36, at 1625.
45. See Daniel, supra note 36, at 1629.
46. Daniel, supra note 36, at 1627-28.
47. Daniel, supra note 36, at 1628.
48. Jamie L. Rhee, Rational and Constitutional Approaches to Airline Safety in the
Face of Terrorist Threats, 49 DEPAUL L. REV. 847, 852-53 (2000). The Anti-Hijacking
Act of 1974 made it illegal to bring a concealed weapon onto an aircraft. Id. at 852-53.
The Air Transportation Security Act of 1974 required the search of all carry-on lug-
520 [Vol. 31
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ued to react with new legislation by requiring the removal of the lug-
gage of passengers who do not board the aircraft. 9
b. Post-9/11 procedures
The attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001, exposed
the flaws with current airport security enforcement-stories of people
with false identification boarding planes, people with firearms walking
right through security-outraging the public.0 The media attention
pressured Congress to make new improvements in both legislation
and enforcement." In reaction to the attacks, Congress passed the
Aviation and Transportation Security Act in November of 200152 The
conferees noted that the terrorist hijackings on September 11, 2001 "re-
quired a fundamental change in the way [we] approach[ ] the task of ensur-
ing the safety and security of the civil air transportation system.
53
Under this legislation, Congress established the Transportation
Security Administration (TSA).' The TSA is responsible for passen-
ger security at airports and has the added responsibility of detecting
and thwarting prospective terrorists through passenger screening by
training employees and by placing federal law enforcement officers at
screening locations.5 The Under Secretary, who heads the TSA, has
the authority to create regulations for aircraft and passenger security.6
gage, and mandated that everyone be searched. Id. at 853.
49. Id. at 852. The Aviation Security Improvement Act of 1990 was passed in
response to the Pan Am flight 103 bombing. Id. at 853-54. Under this regulation, if
passengers do not board the plane, their luggage is removed from the aircraft. Id. at
854. Then, as a reaction to the TWA Flight 800 explosion in 1996, the White House
Commission on Aviation Safety and Security was created to assess and offer solutions
to the problems with United States airport safety. See Daniel, supra note 36, at 1630.
The Commission recommended an increase in spending on technology for screening
and surveillance, establishing computerized passenger profiling, and increasing coun-
terintelligence resources. Daniel, supra note 36, at 1630.
50. Andrew Hessick, The Federalization of Airport Security: Privacy Implica-
tions, 24 WHITTIER L. REv. 43, 47 (2002).
51. Id. at 48.
52. H.R. REP. No. 107-296, at 590 (2001) (Conf. Rep.) reprinted in 2002
U.S.C.C.A.N. 589, 590.
53. Id.
54. Eric P. Haas, Back to the Future? The Use of Biometrics, its Impact on Airport
Security, and How This Technology Should be Governed, 69 J. AIR L. & CoM. 459, 459
(2004).
55. Lenese Herbert, Othello Error: Facial Profiling, Privacy, and the Suppression
of Dissent, 5 Oio ST. J. CRIM. L. 79, 80 (2007).
56. Daniel, supra note 36, at 1632. Under the new regulations, commercial pilots
are allowed to carry handguns, and federal marshals have become standard on domes-
2009]
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In addition, under 49 U.S.C. §44902, the Under Secretary requires
airports to refuse to transport passengers who are not subject to a
search to discern if they are carrying "a dangerous weapon, explosive,
or other destructive substance . . . ." The new legislation required an
increase in security regulations; with this increase, courts must deter-
mine whether the new search measures conform with constitutional
standards for a reasonable search.
C. Express and Implied Consent
In order to implement the security measures at airports, the
searches must conform to an exception to the Fourth Amendment's
warrant requirement, and one of the recognized exceptions to the re-
quirement is "consent."58 Neither a warrant nor probable cause is re-
quired under this exception.59 In addressing these issues, this section
first discusses express and implied consent, and then delves into the
requirement that the consent must be freely given.
1. Express Consent
Courts have held that officials can search without a warrant by
obtaining the individual's consent. 6° People can waive their Fourth
Amendment rights by consent if the "consent is freely and voluntarily
given, and not the result of coercion or duress, actual or implied."61
The Schneckloth v. Bustamonte62 court held that to determine if con-
sent is freely and voluntarily given, the totality of the situation must be
considered. 6 To determine whether the consent was voluntary there
must be a legitimate need for the search, as well as an absence of coer-
cion.64 Acquiescence alone is not enough to establish consent.6 Never-
theless, courts understand that the public is cognizant of the security
tic flights. Haas, supra note 54, at 459.
57. 49 U.S.C.A. § 44902(a)(1) (West 2001).
58. Simcha Herzog, Constitutional Problems Posed by Aviation Security Post
September Eleventh, 6 FLA. COASTAL L. REv. 361, 378-80 (2005).
59. Id. (citing Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30, 35 (1970); Bumper v. North Caroli-
na, 391 U.S. 543 (1968); Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 593 (1946); Zap v. Unit-
ed States, 328 U.S. 624, 630 (1946)).
60. Peter Tiersma, The Language of Silence, 48 RUTGERS L. REv. 1, 58 (1995).
61. Dow, supra note 30, at 1188.
62. 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
63. Dow, supra note 30, at 1188 (citing Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 227).
64. Dow, supra note 30, at 1188.
65. Herzog, supra note 58, at 379 (citing Montana v. Tomich, 332 F.2d 987, 989
(9th Cir. 1964); Judd v. United States, 190 F.2d 649, 650-51 (D.C. Cir. 1951)).
522 [Vol. 31
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measures at airports; thus making the decision to buy a ticket at the
counter shows a willingness to be subjected to a reasonable search.'
The vague nature of consent in these cases has led courts to the doc-
trine of implied consent.
2. Implied Consent
Searches have also been upheld on the rationale of implied con-
sent.67 The first case to discuss implied consent for airport screenings
was United States v. Davis.' The Davis court held that passengers
could choose to submit to the search, which meant they would give up
their Fourth Amendment right or elect not to fly.69 The consent oc-
curred when the passenger chose to proceed to the boarding gate.i ° At
this point, passengers know or should know that they will be subject to
a search.7
United States v. Miner 2 considered the implied consent theory
more directly by applying Davis.73 Miner held that when the passen-
gers approached the counter with the intent to board the aircraft, they
impliedly consented to a search.74 These courts, however, did not ad-
dress at what point in the airport screening process the passengers
could no longer avoid the search by opting to not fly.75
The Ninth Circuit answered that question in United States v. Puli-
do-Baquerizo6 by stating that once passengers put their baggage on
the x-ray conveyer belt, they could no longer avoid being searched by
electing not to fly.' The court reasoned that to allow passengers to
66. Herzog, supra note 58, at 380 (citing United States v. Henry, 615 F.2d 1223,
1228-29 (9th Cir. 1980)).
67. Christopher Slobogin, The World Without a Fourth Amendment, 39 UCLA L.
REV. 1, 23 (1991).
68. Skean, supra note 31, at 579 (citing United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 913
(9th Cir. 1973). The Davis court recognized "consent" as a factor to determine if a
passenger's privacy rights had been violated; however, the court analyzed the facts of
the case using the "administrative search" theory. Id.
69. Skean, supra note 31, at 579.
70. Dow, supra note 30, at 1189.
71. Skean, supra note 31, at 579 (citing United States v. Miner, 484 F.2d 1075,
1076 (9th Cir. 1973)).
72. 484 F.2d 107 (9th Cir. 2007).
73. Skean, supra note 31, at 579 (citing Miner, 484 F.2d at 1076).
74. Skean, supra note 31, at 579 (citing Miner, 484 F.2d at 1076).
75. Skean, supra note 31, at 581-82.
76. 800 F.2d 899 (9th Cir. 1986) (overruled by United States v. Aukai, 497 F.3d
955 (9th Cir. 2007)).
77. United States v. Pulido-Baquerizo, 800 F.2d 899, 901 (9th Cir. 1986)). In Puli-
2009]
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choose not to fly once they were in danger of detection would encour-
age terrorist attacks by allowing terrorist to have a secure exit once in
danger of being caught.78 In another case, United States v. Hartwell,
79
the court also addressed the issue of when or if a passenger can elect
not to fly and avoid being searched, and it held that a person no longer
had the option of choosing not to fly in order to avoid a search once
that person has triggered an alarm.8° If this were not the policy, a ter-
rorist would have "the equivalent of a get-out-of-jail-free card.",81
D. Administrative Searches
Another recognized exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant
requirement is the administrative search.' The essence of an adminis-
trative search is that the search must be conducted as part of the gen-
eral regulatory scheme to further an administrative purpose.' The
Supreme Court of the United States established the constitutionality
of administrative searches in 1967 in Camara v. Municipal Court of
City and County of San Francisco" and See v. City of Seattle.8 In Ca-
mara, the Court balanced the need to search against the intrusiveness
of the search.86 The administrative search shifted the focus of the
probable cause standard from an individualized suspicion to reasona-
bleness in the form of a balancing test.' Thus, probable cause was re-
placed by the reasonableness standard.
do-Baquerizo, the passenger attempted to board an aircraft, and as he entered the
pre-boarding area he placed two briefcases on the x-ray conveyer belt. Id. at 900.
While looking at the x-ray screen, the security officer noticed a dark lined object and
suspected a bomb. Id. He questioned the passenger about the object, then searched
the luggage and found 2,138 grams of cocaine. Id. at 900-01. The Ninth Circuit con-
cluded that when passengers put luggage on an x-ray conveyer belt they "impliedly
consent[ ] to a visual inspection and limited hand search if 'the x-ray is inconclusive in
determining whether the luggage contains weapons or other dangerous objects."' Id.
at 902.
78. Id. at 902.
79. 296 F. Supp. 2d 596 (E.D. Pa. 2003).
80. Haas, supra note 54, at 471 (citing United States v. Hartwell, 296 F. Supp. 2d
596 (E.D. Pa. 2003)).
81. Haas, supra note 54, at 471.
82. See Herzog, supra note 58, at 375.
83. Rogers, supra note 41, at 524.
84. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
85. 387 U.S. 541 (1967); Dow, supra note 30, at 1176.
86. Camara, 387 U.S. at 536-37.
87. Dow, supra note 30, at 1176.
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Furthermore, the administrative search does not usually require a
warrant or probable cause. When there is a compelling governmental
interest, the warrant requirement may be deemed unnecessary if the
intrusion is characterized as a reasonable administrative search.89 If a
warrant were required, the deterrent element would be lost because
the inspections need to be unannounced and frequent in order to be
effective against terroristic acts.9° Because the purpose of the search is
to find terroristic activities, not criminal evidence, the nature of the
investigation will be less intrusive, making the search more likely to
pass the reasonableness standard under the Constitution.9! ' Further-
more, a person who engages in activity that is part of a "pervasively
regulated business" is assumed to be subject to an inspection.
United States v. Davis was the first to apply administrative search
analysis to airport security screenings.93 The Ninth Circuit reasoned
that all the elements of an airport screening fit the description of an
administrative search.94 As the Davis court noted, airport security
screenings are part of a general regulatory scheme to further the ad-
ministrative purpose of preventing people from carrying weapons or
explosives onto aircrafts. 95 Such screenings are not conducted to find
evidence of a person carrying weapons onto an aircraft, but are meant
to deter passengers from attempting to do so.96
Airport screenings also fit within the administrative search defini-
tion because the requirement of a warrant or individualized suspicion
would simply "frustrate the purpose of the search." 97 Although airport
screenings may be properly categorized as administrative searches, the
searches must be reasonable and limited to an administrative purpose
in order to be constitutional.98 The following section will cover the role
88. Herzog, supra note 58, at 376.
89. Haas, supra note 54, at 463.
90. Herzog, supra note 58, at 375.
91. Dow, supra note 30, at 1176.
92. Herzog, supra note 58, at 375. For example, in New York v. Burger, the Unit-
ed States Supreme Court held that a junkyard owner was in a "closely regulated"
industry, and because of that, he would have a lessened expectation of privacy. The
Court held that the warrant and probable cause requirements under the Fourth
Amendment would have a reduced application. New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691,
702 (1987).
93. Davis, 482 F.2d at 908.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Herzog, supra note 58, at 377 (citing United States v. Schafer, 461 F.2d 856,
858 (9th Cir. 1972)).
98. Herzog, supra note 58, at 377.
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of consent,99 reasonableness of the search,1" and scope of the adminis-
trative search. 1
1. Consent
Prior case law established that consent is revocable in an adminis-
trative search.l° The Davis court held that an important factor under
the administrative search doctrine in the airport setting is that the pas-
senger be allowed to elect not to board the plane and avoid the
search. 03 The United States v. Homberg" court upheld Davis and ruled
that a person may revoke consent at any time prior to boarding. 5
These courts reasoned that searching a passenger who elected not to
fly would no longer serve the purpose of deterring that passenger from
taking a weapon onto the plane.' 6 The logic is that a search at this
point would only serve the purpose of a criminal investigation, and
therefore, would not be within the boundaries of an administrative
search."
Although courts continued to require the right to revoke consent
as a requirement for an airport administrative search, the United
States Supreme Court held that consent is not required for an admin-
istrative search to be constitutional.1 ° In United States v. Biswell,1 the
Court ruled that the lawfulness of a search does not depend on con-
sent.10 The Court reasoned that when there is a regulatory inspection
system of a business that is specifically restricted in time, place, and
scope, the lawfulness of the search then depends on a valid statute's
authority, which depends on reasonableness.1
99. See infra Part III.D.1
100. See infra Part III.D.2.
101. See infra Part III.D.3.
102. See Stephen P. Halbrook, Firearms, the Fourth Amendment, and the Air Car-
rier Security, 52 J. AIR L. & COM. 585, 647 (1987).
103. Skean, supra note 31, at 576-77.
104. 546 F.2d 1350, 1352 (9th Cir. 1977) (overruled by United States v. Aukai, 497
F.3d 955 (9th Cir. 2007).
105. Id. at 1352. The court affirmed Davis and held that the Government's power
to search in the boarding area was too sweeping. Id.
106. See Rogers, supra note 41, at 525.
107. Rogers, supra note 41, at 525.
108. See United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 315 (1972).
109. 406 U.S. 311 (1972).
110. Id. at 315.
111. Id.
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2. Reasonableness
For an administrative search to be constitutional, it must meet the
basic standard of reasonableness."2 To elaborate on how airport
screenings must meet the reasonableness standard, the Supreme Court
of the United States in Chandler v. Miller"3 explained: "[W]here the
risk to public safety is substantial and real, blanket suspicionless
searches calibrated to the risk may rank as 'reasonable'-for example,
searches now routine at airports and at entrances to courts and other
official buildings."."
In National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab,"5 the Court
detailed how to determine if the search is reasonable by laying out the
following test: "[W]here a Fourth Amendment intrusion serves spe-
cial governmental needs, beyond the normal need for law enforce-
ment, it is necessary to balance the individual's privacy expectations
against the Government's interests to determine whether it is imprac-
tical to require a warrant or some level of individualized suspicion in
the particular context.""' 6 Thus, reasonableness is determined by ba-
lancing the need for the search against the invasion to a person's
Fourth Amendment rights that would occur from the search."7
As an example of applying this balancing test, the Court in Mich-
igan Department of State Police v. Sitz"8 determined that suspicionless
sobriety checkpoints on highways were constitutional."9 The Court
held that the state's interest in preventing drunken driving, balanced
with the minimal intrusion to drivers, weighed in favor of finding the
checkpoints constitutionally reasonable.2
3. Scope
An important limitation on administrative search theory is that
the search must be for a stated administrative purpose, and if it turns
into a criminal investigation, it is no longer justified as an administra-
112. Davis, 482 F.2d at 910.
113. 520 U.S. 305 (1997).
114. Id. at 323 (citing Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v.Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656,
674-676, & n. 3 (1989)).
115. 489 U.S. 656 (1989).
116. Id. at 665-66.
117. Rogers, supra note 41, at 524.
118. 496 U.S. 444 (1990).
119. Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 447-48 (1990).
120. Id. at 451-52.
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tive search.' The Davis court explained this issue by stating that there
is a danger in the screening of passengers and their luggage for wea-
pons that the search will turn into a "general search for evidence of
crime."'' A security search is constitutionally reasonable if it "is no
more extensive nor [more] intensive than necessary, in the light of
current technology, to detect the presence of weapons or explosives []
[and that is] confined in good faith to that purpose."' '
An example of when an administrative search turned into a crim-
inal investigation is found in United States v. $124,570 U.S. Currency."4
In this case, the law enforcement officer and the Flight Terminal Secu-
rity were working together, and if criminal activity was found, then the
officer would get a reward.' The court concluded that this search was
outside the scope of an administrative search because the search was a
tool of a criminal investigation. 6
Additionally, the Hartwell court held that for a search to be with-
in the scope of a lawful administrative search it must be minimally
intrusive.2 7 Search procedures are minimally intrusive if they are
"well-tailored to protect personal privacy, escalating in invasiveness
only after a lower level of screening disclosed a reason to conduct a
more probing search."'" The importance of an administrative search
having the requirement of staying within the permissible scope is that
there is a great danger of screenings going too far without probable
cause or a search warrant. ' As the United States v. Schafer130 court
stated, however, if the search is properly conducted under proper au-
thority and criminal evidence is inadvertently found, reporting that
evidence to the police is not an unlawful action. 3'
The history of airport security demonstrates that Congress reacts
to terrorist attacks by passing new legislation, and post-9/11 was no
exception. These new regulations had to fit within a Fourth
Amendment warrant or probable cause exception to be constitution-
121. Dow, supra note 30, at 1178.
122. Davis, 482 F.2d at 909.
123. Id. at 913.
124. 873 F.2d 1240, 1245 (9th Cir. 1989).
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. United States v. Hartwell, 436 F.3d 174, 180 (2006).
128. Id.
129. Dow, supra note 30, at 1180.
130. 461 F.2d 856 (9th Cir. 1972).
131. Id. at 859.
132. See Daniel, supra note 36, at 1629.
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al.'33 Consent and administrative searches are two recognized excep-
tions.'9 Law prior to Aukai held that consent for an implied consent
search could not be revoked once the passenger was in the pre-
boarding area. In contrast, the courts concluded that for an adminis-
trative search to be constitutional the passenger must have the option
of choosing not to fly and avoid being searched." The next section of
the note describes the Aukai opinion and details the facts in the case
and how the court ultimately came to its conclusion.
III. THE CASE
A. Facts
Daniel Kuualoha Aukai arrived at the Honolulu International
Airport on February 1, 2003, with the intent to fly from Honolulu,
Hawaii to Kona, Hawaii.'37 Upon arriving at the airport, he went to the
ticket counter to check in but did not present a government-issued
picture identification.'38 Because he had no identification, the ticket
agent wrote "No ID" on his boarding pass.39 Mr. Aukai next stopped
at the airport security checkpoint at approximately 9:00 A.M.4 Signs
posted there stated that prospective passengers and their baggage
were subject to search. 4' At the checkpoint, Mr. Aukai laid his shoes
and other items into a plastic bin and walked through the magnetome-
ter. 42 The magnetometer did not signal the presence of any metal.143
Likewise, his shoes raised no suspicion."
After the magnetometer screening, Mr. Aukai handed his board-
ing pass to TSA Officer Corrine Motonago (Officer Motonago).' 4
Due to the fact that the boarding pass stated "No ID," Officer Moto-
nago directed Mr. Aukai to a roped off area for a second screening.)
133. Herzog, supra note 58, at 378-80.
134. Dow, supra note 30, at 1167-68.
135. Haas, supra note 54, at 470-71.
136. Haas, supra note 54, at 471.
137. United States v. Aukai, 497 F.3d 955, 957 (9th Cir. 2007).
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. A magnetometer is a metal detector. Id.
143. United States v. Aukai, 497 F.3d 955, 957 (9th Cir. 2007).
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. A second screening is a TSA procedure for passengers who have "No ID"
written on their boarding pass, even if a passenger did not raise suspicion in the first
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Mr. Aukai initially went to the designated area, but stated that he was
in a hurry because his flight was leaving soon." Mr. Aukai subse-
quently left the area and went to gather his items from the bin.'4 Upon
seeing this, Officer Motonago informed him that he was not allowed
to obtain his belongings and instructed him to stay in the designated
149
area.
Mr. Aukai tried to explain to TSA Officer Andrew Misajon (Of-
ficer Misajon), who performed the second screening, that he was in a
hurry because his flight was leaving soon."' Officer Misajon instructed
Mr. Aukai to sit in a chair.5' Mr. Aukai sat down, but before the
screening began, Mr. Aukai asked if he could leave."2 Officer Misajon
did not respond and began to screen Mr. Aukai with the hand magne-
tometer to detect if any metal was present.' Officer Misajon in-
structed Mr. Aukai to stand. 54 As the wand passed across the front of
Mr. Aukai's body, the alarm sounded around the area of his front
right pants pocket.' Officer Misajon then asked Mr. Aukai if he had
anything in his pocket, to which Mr. Aukai responded that he did
not.'56 Officer Misajon passed the magnetometer around the pocket
area a second time and the alarm sounded again.' Officer Misajon
asked again if there was anything in Mr. Aukai's pocket, and again
Mr. Aukai replied there was not.' Officer Misajon saw the outline of
an object in Mr. Aukai's pocket and felt the outside of Mr. Aukai's
pants with the back of his hand and determined that there was some-
screening. Id. A second screening involves a TSA officer moving a handheld magne-
tometer close to and around the passenger's body. Id. If metal is detected, an alarm
sounds. Id. The TSA officer next attempts to determine the cause of the alarm, which
may involve feeling the outside of the passenger's clothing where the alarm sounded.
Id. If the area is close to a pocket, the passenger may be directed to empty the pocket.
Id.
147. Id. His flight was scheduled for a 9:05 A.M. departure, just five minutes after
he arrived at the checkpoint. Id.
148. Id.
149. United States v. Aukai, 497 F.3d 955,957 (9th Cir. 2007).
150. Id. Mr. Misajon's duties included screening passengers for weapons, knives, or
anything else not allowed so that the passengers could enter the sterile area. Brief of
Appellant at 4, United States v. Aukai, No. 04-10226 (9th Cir. July 19, 2004).
151. Aukai, 497 F.3d at 957.
152. Brief of Appellant, supra note 150, at 5.
153. Id.
154. Aukai, 497 F.3d at 957.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.
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thing inside the pocket. "9 Mr. Aukai then told Officer Misajon that he
missed his flight and wanted to leave the airport.6
TSA supervisor Vizcarra (Mr. Vizcarra) came to Officer Misajon
and asked if he needed assistance.' After Officer Misajon told him
the facts, Mr. Vizcarra asked Officer Misajon to screen Mr. Aukai
again." The alarm sounded again in the pocket area, and Mr. Vizcarra
told Mr. Aukai to empty his pocket.' 63 Mr. Aukai again denied that
there was anything in his pocket. Mr. Vizcarra then touched the out-
side of Mr. Aukai's pocket area with the back of his hand and felt
something." Mr. Vizcarra again instructed Mr. Aukai to empty his
pocket.' Mr. Aukai then removed keys or change, but there was still
a visible bulge.'6 He was told again to empty his pocket, and after first
denying there was anything, he removed an object wrapped in tissue
paper.'67 Mr. Aukai then placed the object on a tray.
Mr. Vizcarra suspected that the object may be a weapon and
summoned over a law enforcement officer.'69 Mr. Vizcarra proceeded
to unwrap the object and found a glass pipe used to smoke metham-
phetamine.170 Mr. Aukai was then taken to an office near the security
checkpoint. 7' He was placed under arrest and searched.72 The police
found several transparent bags of a white crystal substance in Mr. Au-
kai's front pants pockets.73 Mr. Aukai was taken into federal custody
and advised of his Miranda rights, which he waived. 74 Mr. Aukai then
gave a statement and inculpated himself for possession of methamphe-
tamine.' 5
159. Id.
160. Brief of Appellant, supra note 150, at 5.
161. United States v. Aukai, 497 F.3d 955, 958 (9th Cir. 2007).
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. United States v. Aukai, 497 F.3d 955, 958 (9th Cir. 2007).
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id. Mr. Vizcarro testified that TSA training does not include drug detection.
Brief of Appellant, supra note 150, at 5. He also testified that the duty of a TSA
screener is "to protect the public from potential hijackers, and bombers and to keep
weapons off the plane." Brief of Appellant, supra note 150, at 5.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. United States v. Aukai, 497 F.3d 955, 958 (9th Cir. 2007).
174. Id.
175. Id.
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Mr. Aukai "was indicted for knowingly and intentionally possess-
ing, with the intent to distribute, [fifty] grams or more of methamphe-
tamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) and 841(b)(1)(A)(viii)."' 76 On
May 23, 2003,177 Mr. Aukai "filed a motion to suppress the evidence
found incident to his arrest at the airport and the statement he later
made."178 The district court denied his motion.179 Then, on October 8,
2003, Mr. Aukai pled guilty in a written plea agreement in order to
preserve the right to appeal the court's denial of his motion to sup-
press evidence."8 The district court sentenced Mr. Aukai to a seventy-
month term of imprisonment and five years of supervised release.8 '
Mr. Aukai appealed the judgment. '
B. Reasoning
In United States v. Aukai,8 3 the court determined whether consent
is required under the Fourth Amendment for an airport screening
search.' 8' The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
held that an airport screening search was a constitutionally reasonable
administrative search, and therefore, consent was not required." The
concurring opinion agreed with the majority's decision but stated that
the court's analysis placed excessive emphasis on terrorism.
'16
The majority began its analysis by stating portions of the Fourth
Amendment of the United States Constitution with a focus on an in-
dividual's right to be secure against unreasonable searches and sei-
zures. The court elaborated on the "unreasonable" standard and
stated that, absent suspicion, a search or seizure is generally unreason-
able."' From this point, the court described exceptions to the general
176. Id.
177. Brief of Appellant, supra note 150, at 2.
178. United States v. Aukai, 497 F.3d 955, 958 (9th Cir. 2007).
179. Id.
180. Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee at 2, United States v. Aukai, No. 04-10226 (9thCir.
Aug. 15, 2004). Mr. Aukai contended that the district court erred in denying his mo-
tion to suppress. Id. Mr. Aukai alleged that the search was conducted after he re-
quested to leave. Id. He argued that the search did not serve a legitimate purpose and
was illegal. Id.
181. Aukai, 497 F.3d at 958.
182. Id.
183. 497 F.3d 955, 958 (9th Cir. 2007).
184. Id. at 960.
185. Id. at 963.
186. Id. (Graber, J., concurring).
187. Id. at 958.
188. Id.
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rule.8 9 This section of the note will detail the court's reasoning of how
airport screening fits into an exception to the general warrant re-
quirement, and how the court determines that airport screening is not
dependent on consent.' 90 The court's analysis fits into the categories of
administrative searches,' consent,9" and limits on airport searches.' 93
1. Administrative Searches
After noting exceptions to the general requirements of Fourth
Amendment searches, the court gave a description of how administra-
tive searches fit into this exception.9" The court first described cir-
cumstances when suspicion is not required to conduct a search.9
Those instances include situations where there is a substantial risk to
public safety.' The court reasoned that a "blanket suspicionless"
search attuned to that situation may be reasonable.9
The court further explained that if there has been an infringe-
ment of a Fourth Amendment right that serves a special governmental
need that is beyond what is needed for normal law enforcement, then
it is necessary to conduct a balancing test to determine if the search is
reasonable.9 The court elaborated that if there is a real and substan-
tial risk to public safety, a blanket suspicionless search may be reason-
able.'9" When this happens, there needs to be a balancing between the
individual's privacy expectations and the government's interests."0
The result of the balancing test will tell the court whether it is imprac-
tical to require a warrant or some articulable suspicion to conduct the
search."'
The court noted that the Supreme Court of the United States has
upheld administrative searches. °' The first case discussed was New
189. United States v. Aukai, 497 F.3d 955, 958 (9th Cir. 2007).
190. See infra Parts III.B.1-3.
191. See infra Part III.B.1.
192. See infra Part III.B.2.
193. See infra Part III.B.3.
194. United States v. Aukai, 497 F.3d 955, 958-60 (9th Cir. 2007).
195. Id. at 958-59, & n.2.
196. Id. at 958.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 959.
199. Id. at 958-59.
200. United States v. Aukai, 497 F.3d 955,959 (9th Cir. 2007).
201. Id. at 959.
202. Id. The court stated in footnote two that although the Supreme Court of the
United States has not held that airport screening searches are administrative searches,
the Court has suggested in three cases that they are. Id. Aukai referred to the follow-
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York v. Burger,"3 where the Court reasoned that because a junkyard
owner was in a "'closely regulated' industry" and there was a lower
expectation of privacy, the requirements for a warrant and probable
cause were less applicable.' The Burger Court concluded that the
state's interest in regulating the junkyard business served a "special
need," which allowed an inspection without a warrant.
2°5
The court also discussed Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz,20
in which the Supreme Court of the United States upheld suspicionless
sobriety checkpoints.27 The Sitz Court held that the balance between
the state's interest in preventing drunken driving and the amount of
intrusion on individual motorists leaned more heavily toward finding
the checkpoints constitutionally reasonable. 8
Following this analysis, the court held airport screenings to be
constitutionally reasonable administrative searches.2° The court found
that the searches, including Aukai's, are reasonable because they are
part of a regulatory scheme that furthers an administrative purpose; in
particular, the prevention of carrying weapons or explosives onto
planes, which prevents hijackings.210 The Court then described the role
that consent plays in the reasonableness of the searches."'
2. Consent
The court next endeavored to explain why consent was not neces-
sary for a constitutionally reasonable administrative search. The
court began its explanation by stating that the United States Supreme
Court previously concluded that the constitutionality of administrative
searches did not depend on consent of the person searched.23 The
ing cases: City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 47-48 (2000); Chandler v.
Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 323 (1997); and Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab,
489 U.S. 656,675 & n. 3 (1989). Id.
203. 482 U.S. 691 (1987).
204. Aukai, 497 F.3d at 959. (quoting Burger, 482 U.S. at 702).
205. Id. (citing Burger, 482 U.S. at 708-09).
206. 496 U.S. 444 (1990).
207. Aukai, 497 F.3d at 959 (citing Sitz, 496 U.S. at 455).
208. Id.
209. Aukai, 497 F.3d at 960. The court cited United States v. Hartwell, 436 F.3d
174, 178 (3d Cir. 2006); United States v. Marquez, 410 F.3d, 612, 616 (9th Cir. 2005);
and United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 908 (9th Cir. 1973); Id.
210. Aukai, 497 F.3d at 960.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 960-61.
213. Id.
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court cited United States Biswell,"' where the Supreme Court held that
a warrantless search of a pawnshop gun showroom was authorized
because the federal gun control statute authorized the search.215 The
Supreme Court reasoned that when there is a regulatory inspection
limited in time, place, and scope, the constitutionality depended on
the authority of a valid statute, and not on consent.216
The court next stated its belief that its case law had incorrectly
suggested that consent was required for a reasonable airport security
search through "either ongoing consent or irrevocable implied con-
sent., 217 The court concluded that an airport screening search is not
dependent on consent to be constitutional because such a search is
reasonable.
The court explained the consequences of requiring consent in this
context. 2'9 The court emphasized terrorism in the "post-9/11 world,"
and reasoned that if consent were not required, it would make it much
easier for a terrorist to plan and carry out attacks." ° The court rea-
soned that if terrorists were allowed to elect to leave when subject to
search, they could make repeated attempts to get on a plane until they
were successful.22' The terrorists could use the knowledge of weak-
nesses in certain airports to plan an attack.72
After the court established that consent was not necessary, it dis-
cussed the requirements of a reasonable airport screening search.2u
The court stated that if the search was otherwise reasonable and per-
formed pursuant to statutory authority-in this instance 49 U.S.C. §
44901-the only requirement for a reasonable search was the passen-
ger's election to attempt to enter the secured area of an airport. 4 Un-
214. 406 U.S. 311 (1972).
215. Aukai, 497 F.3d at 959-60 (citing Biswell, 406 U.S. at 317).
216. Id. at 960 (citing Biswell, 406 at 315).
217. United States v. Aukai, 497 F.3d 955, 960-61 (9th Cir. 2007).
218. Id. at 960-61.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 960-61. The concurring opinion stated that the majority's references to
terrorists and 9/11 were "irrelevant and distracting." Id. at 963. The opinion stated
that the reference was not necessary because Mr. Aukai's search was reasonable as an
administrative search, and that the references to post-9/11 did not enhance the court's
analysis. Id. The concurring opinion further explained that whether or not a person is
a terrorist is not legally significant. Id. The concurring opinion concluded that the
majority's rationale would allow future litigation to challenge the viability of that
holding. Id. at 964.
221. Id. at 960-61
222. Id. at 961.
223. United States v. Aukai, 497 F.3d 955 (9th Cir. 2007).
224. Id.
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der TSA regulations, the election takes place "when a prospective
passenger walks through the magnetometer or places items on the
conveyor belt of the x-ray machine." 2 ' The facts showed that Mr. Au-
kai chose to attempt to enter into the secured area of the airport when
he walked through the magnetometer.2 By taking these actions, he
subjected himself to the airport screening process."
The court concluded its discussion on consent by stating that this
decision would overrule any cases that held that the reasonableness of
an airport security search was predicated on "either ongoing consent
or irrevocable implied consent. . . ."2' After the court concluded that
consent was not required for an airport screening process, it pro-
ceeded to explain the limits of permissible screening. 29
3. Limits on Airport Searches
The court tied the limits of an airport screening to the general
principles used to ensure that a search was constitutionally reasona-
ble."0 Ordinarily, a search must not be more extensive or intensive
than necessary, considering the technology available, to detect wea-
pons or explosives, and it must be conducted in good faith for that
purpose."1 The court then concluded that the screening of Mr. Aukai
in the airport satisfied those requirements. 2 The search procedures
used with Mr. Aukai were not more extensive or intensive than neces-
sary, under those circumstances, to rule out whether explosives or
guns were present. 3 The court analyzed the facts of the Aukai case
and reiterated that after Mr. Aukai passed through the magnetometer,
he was directed to a second screening.23 The court stated that it was
only after the wand sounded again during this screening and Mr. Au-
kai continued to deny there was anything in his pocket that Officer
Misajon employed a more intrusive search. 35
225. Id.
226. Id. at 962.
227. Id. at 962.
228. Id. at 960.
229. United States v. Aukai, 497 F.3d 955, 960-61 (9th Cir. 2007).
230. Id. at 962.
231. Id. (quoting Davis, 482 F.2d at 913).
232. Id.
233. Id. at 962.
234. Id. at 962.
235. United States v. Aukai, 497 F.3d 955, 962 (9th Cir. 2007).
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Next, the court focused on the fact that after the item was de-
tected, Mr. Vizcarra became involved.' The court then concluded
that these search procedures were "minimally intrusive. ,237 In addi-
tion, the court held that the duration of Mr. Aukai's detention at the
airport was also reasonable.ns The approximate time of detainment
was eighteen minutes3 9 The court reasoned that while Mr. Aukai's
detainment lasted longer than detentions that were approved in other
cases, M the time of his detention was reasonable for a search for wea-
pons or explosives."' In addition, the court noted that Mr. Aukai's
time of detention was prolonged due to his own conduct.242 The court
concluded that the airport screening search was a constitutionally rea-
sonable administrative search.243
After detailing the law in the area of airport security and adminis-
trative searches, the court held that the search of Mr. Aukai was law-
ful.24 The court held that because there was a substantial risk to public
safety through the threat of people bringing weapons onto planes, an
administrative search could be used to screen Mr. Aukai for wea-
pons.245 Next, the court concluded that administrative searches were
constitutional and that Mr. Aukai's search was not dependent on his
consent.24 The court concluded by stating that Mr. Aukai's search was
within the scope of an administrative search because at the time the
236. Id. It was after the alarm sounded that Mr. Vizcarra instructed Mr. Aukai to
empty his pocket. Id. After Mr. Aukai again denied there was anything in his pocket,
Mr. Vizcarra touched the outside of Mr. Aukai's pants and felt something. Id. Mr.
Aukai was again instructed to empty his pocket and after he said there was nothing
there, he removed an object wrapped in tissue paper. Id. Mr. Vizcarra unwrapped it
because he suspected the item might be a weapon and discovered that it was drug
paraphernalia. Id.
237. Id. The court used the definition of "minimally intrusive" as "procedures
[that] are 'well-tailored to protect personal privacy, escalating in invasiveness only
after a lower level of screening disclosed a reason to conduct a more probing search."'
Id. (quoting Hartwell, 436 F.3d 174,180 (3d Cir. 2006)).
238. Id. at 962-63.
239. United States v. Aukai, 497 F.3d 955,963 (9th Cir. 2007).
240. Id. The court referred to Sitz, 496 U.S. at 448, where the average detention
was twenty-five seconds and United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 546-47
(1976), where the average detention was three to five minutes. Id.
241. Id.
242. Id. at 963 n. 10.
243. Id. at 963.
244. Id. at 962-63.
245. United States v. Aukai, 497 F.3d 955,958 (9th Cir. 2007).
246. Id. at 960.
20091
UALR LAW REVIEW
TSA found drugs on Mr. Aukai, they were searching for weapons.47The next section of the note will give an analysis of this decision.
IV. ANALYSIS
The Aukai case gave a cohesive standard for analyzing airport se-
curity searches. Before this case there were several attempts at de-
scribing the constitutionality of airport searches, but there was no co-
hesive standard. The two most recognized exceptions to having a war-
rant or probable cause are consent and administrative searches.24
There is much overlap between the implied consent and adminis-
trative search theories. The implied consent theory, like the adminis-
trative search theory, held that a warrant supported by probable cause
is not required.2 49 Under this theory, unlike prior administrative search
analyses, consent could no longer be revoked once a person entered
the secured area of an airport."50 The irrevocable consent element was
correctly decided; however, the administrative search theory set out a
more concise rationale for why searches are permissible and correctly
limited the scope of the search. This section of the note will analyze
the role of consent in airport searches, the rationale for airport
searches,2 and the permissible scope of the searches.2 3
A. Consent
The administrative search theory, prior to Aukai, was based on
the sound reasoning that an administrative search was appropriate
because an airport search was a regulatory search for the purpose of
deterring people from bringing weapons onto planes, and not to detect
crime.' Cases held, however, that for an administrative search to be
constitutional, passengers needed to have the option of not boarding
the plane and avoiding the search. 55 These cases stated that once the
247. Id. at 962.
248. Dow, supra note 30, at 1168.
249. Herzog, supra note 58, at 378-80.
250. Skean, supra note 31, at 581-82.
251. See infra Part IV.A.
252. See infra Part IV.B.
253. See infra Part IV.C.
254. See United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 898, 908 (9th Cir. 1976).
255. See e.g. Homburg, 546 F.2d 1350, 1352 (9th Cir. 1976) (discussing the rationale
of Davis as support for the idea that consent is revocable as long as the passenger
remains free to leave the boarding area); see also Davis, 482 F.2d at 908.
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passenger leaves the boarding area there is no need for a deterrent to
bringing weapons onto the plane. 6
As the legislative history shows, when there are new attacks and
threats to airport security, there needs to be new regulations to react
to those threats and to try to prevent future attacks. 7 This was the
action Aukai took by adopting the administrative search theory to
respond to the 9/11 attacks. Before these attacks took place it may
have been sufficient for the search to end once the passenger left the
secured area, but these attacks showed the need to prohibit a passen-
ger from avoiding being searched by opting out of flying.
Aukai correctly concluded that administrative searches of passen-
gers are constitutional, and correctly concluded that consent is not
required for these searches to be constitutional. The court based this
on the fact that administrative searches were found to be constitution-
al in Burger and Sitz 8 The Aukai court also reasoned that consent is
not required in administrative searches based on the United States
Supreme Court case of Biswell. 59 Unlike the previous cases, Aukai
applies this reasoning to airport security.
B. Rationale for Searches
The administrative search theory lays out the correct rationale for
why airport searches fit within an exception to the Fourth Amend-
ment warrant requirement. Airport searches are conducted in a heavi-
ly regulated area for the governmental purpose of protecting the lives
of millions of people.2' This rationale captures the essence of why air-
port searches are conducted. Thus, the balance of the intrusion of the
search against deterring terrorist activity, weighs in favor of allowing
the search. 26' In addition, the search fits into this theory because if a
warrant were required, the effectiveness of the search would be lost.
262
C. Scope
The scope of administrative searches is that they are only con-
ducted with the intent to deter people from bringing weapons onto
256. See Homburg, 546 F.2d at 1352; see also Davis, 482 F.2d at 908.
257. See Daniel, supra note 36, at 1629-630. See supra Part II.B.
258. United States v. Aukai, 497 F.3d 955, 959 (9th Cir. 2007).
259. Id. at 959-60.
260. Davis, 482 F.2d at 908.
261. United States v. Aukai, 497 F.3d 955, 961 (9th Cir. 2007).
262. Herzog, supra note 58, at 375.
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planes.263 Because they are no longer justifiable once the search is for
criminal activity, the searches are more likely to be reasonable be-
cause they are less intrusive." If criminal evidence is found inadver-
tently during the course of a lawful administrative search, however,
that evidence is allowable at trial against the accused.) 5 Based on this
reasoning, the Aukai court correctly allowed in the evidence of me-
thamphetamine found on Mr. Aukai. This theory protects society by
not protecting those who are breaking the law or who are a possible
danger to others simply because the evidence was found incident to an
administrative search. The administrative search theory provides a
deterrent for terrorist and is also as minimally intrusive as possible to
effectively conduct the search.
V. CONCLUSION
Airport searches are necessary to ensure the safety and security
of air travel.266 These searches must not infringe upon the right to be
free from unreasonable searches and seizures, which is secured by the
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.267 Administra-
tive searches comply with this amendment despite the lack of a war-
rant supported by probable cause. They are reasonable if they are
conducted with the sole purpose of deterring crime. The administra-
tive search theory, not requiring consent, was correctly applied to air-
port searches in the United States v. Aukai decision.
The Aukai decision should be adopted in other jurisdictions be-
cause it sets out an applicable standard that is limited and also effec-
tively deters terrorist hijackings. The standard is limited because the
search must be for an administrative purpose, and once the search
goes outside those limits, a warrant would be required to continue the
search.' The administrative search helps assure that the government
is not abusing its power because it limits the searches conducted only
for the purpose of deterring people from carrying weapons onto
planes. The administrative search that limits the right to revoke con-
sent will deter terrorist attacks and also help limit the invasiveness of
the searches.
263. Davis, 482 F.2d at 908.
264. Dow, supra note 30, at 1176.
265. Schafer, 461 F.2d 856, 859 (9th Cir. 1972).
266. H.R. REP. No. 107-296, at 53 (2001)(Conf. Rep.) reprinted in 2002
U.S.C.C.A.N. 589, 590.
267. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
268. Dow, supra note 30, at 1178.
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